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Investment incentives (subsidies designed to affect the location of investment) are a pervasive 
feature of global competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). They are used by the vast 
majority of countries, at multiple levels of government, in a broad range of industries. They take 
a variety of forms, including tax holidays, grants and free land. Politicians, at least in the United 
States, may have good electoral incentives to use them.1 
 
The Philippines has been estimated to spend 1% of GDP on “redundant” investment incentives 
(the investment would have come without subsidy); Vietnam’s incentives were estimated at 
0.7% of GDP in 2002; and US state and local governments spend approximately US$ 46.8 
billion per year on location subsidies.2 This is just the tip of the iceberg, as most countries’ 
incentive spending is poorly reported. 
 
Like all subsidies, investment incentives tend to be economically inefficient and make income 
distributions more unequal (by transferring funds from average taxpayers to owners of capital). 
At times, they subsidize environmentally harmful projects, such as building a shopping center in 
a wetlands area.3 Incentives are not always a bad policy, but their use requires taking potential 
problems into consideration. 
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Bargaining over incentives is characterized by major information asymmetries, leading to the 
likelihood of a government paying more than needed to attract an investment. Companies often 
conduct an incentives auction even when they have already made their location decision,4 a clear 
sign of rent-seeking behavior.5 
 
The past two decades have seen the spread of incentives to developing countries. Sometimes 
they find themselves in direct competition with industrialized countries for a particular 
investment. There are numerous cases in which developing countries have paid much higher 
incentives than those paid for similar investments in developed countries, reducing funds for 
infrastructure and education. A recent example is Goiás state's (Brazil) US$ 125 million subsidy 
to Usina Canada for a US$ 25 million investment in an ethanol facility in 2009, which came to 
over US$ 200,000 per job. In India, Gujarat state won a 2008 competition for the right to 
produce the Tata Nano. While subsidy estimates vary widely, they start at about US$ 800 million, 
far above the cost of Tata’s investment. 
 
Given the potential problems and risks of using incentives, many analysts have sought policies to 
control them. The most comprehensive approach is embodied in EU regional aid policy, which 
sets a maximum level of subsidy for every region in the European Union, with the highest 
subsidies allowed only in the European Union’s poorest regions; many richer areas are banned 
from providing regional aid to any company. Moreover, these maxima are progressively reduced 
for investments over € 50 million, which helps put the brakes on the size of incentives. EU state 
aid rules require subsidies to be notified in advance to the European Commission and provide the 
Commission wide discretion to approve, prohibit or modify a proposed subsidy. The notification 
rules ensure a level of transparency seen in few other parts of the world. The EU rules have 
meant that Member States have given much smaller subsidies than US state governments for 
similar investments. For example, Hyundai received incentives of about US$ 117,000 per job 
from Alabama in 2002, but only about US$ 75,000 per job from the Czech Republic in 2007. 
Alabama’s per capita income in 2006 was US$ 29,414 while the Czech Republic’s was 
US$ 12,680 at current exchange rates and US$ 21,470 at purchasing power parity exchange rates. 
This and similar comparisons strongly suggest that EU regional aid control is effective in 
reducing investment incentives. 
 
At the global level, no comparable rules specifically address location subsidies, although the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures applies to all subsidies and the 
OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises provides for 
consultations. Subnational agreements in Australia and Canada prohibit subsidizing the 
relocation of existing operations (more successfully in the former than in the latter), and Vietnam, 
like the European Union, has variable subsidy limits for its provinces based on their per capita 
income. 
 
Outside the European Union and several US states, information on incentives is only as good as 
a country’s press corps. Australia and Canada collect reports on incentives from their states and 
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provinces, but do not make this data public. Thus, transparency is the first step to reform in most 
of the world. 
 
Beyond transparency, other reforms can make incentive policy more effective. This would 
include banning relocation subsidies, adopting job quality guidelines and “clawback” policies to 
reclaim incentives from firms that do not meet their investment or job creation commitments, 
requiring linkages with local enterprises, and adopting regional incentive control rules like those 
in the European Union. 
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